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The Hammer, the Sickle, and the Phosphate
Rock: The 1974 Political Controversy over
Florida Phosphate Shipments to the Soviet
Union
by Brad Massey

"We may be able to substitute nuclear power for coal power,
and plastics for wood, and yeast for meat, and friendship
for isolation-but for phosphorus there is neither substitute nor replacement."-Isaac Asimov 1
he price of Florida phosphate rock skyrocketed in the
1970s. Corporate profits soared as well, peaking in 19801981 as phosphate-based fertilizers were applied to more
and more farms through0ut the world. During this boom decade,
Florida phosphate companies acquired new lands for strip-mining
operations, invested billions in new industrial infrastructure and
employee payrolls, and created thousands of jobs. Over 90% of
the phosphate rock extracted from the Florida earth was used
for fertilizer production, which industry proponents argued was
a noble global industrial cause. Florida mining boosters testified
that phosphate fertilizers increased farm yields, staving off starvation and food scarcity for millions. In the absence of mined

T
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1
Isaac Asimov, Fact and Fancy (New York: Avon Books, 1972).
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Florida phosphate rock-industry proponents liked to publicly
proclaim-stomachs throughout the world would face the pangs
of malnourishment.
But not all were convinced of the Florida phosphate industry's
benevolence. Rumors of OPEC-like deals with Moroccan phosphate producers, Florida environmental degradation, and a 1974
deal with the Soviet Union brokered by an influential businessman, Dr. Armand Hammer, raised critics' suspicions of the industry in the 1970s. "We are all suckers," Florida's Secretary of State
and later U.S. Senator Richard Stone sneered in 1974. Pointing
to dramatically rising food prices in America, Stone publicly asked
why Florida phosphate, a finite and indispensable element, was
being supplied to the nation's Cold War nemesis. "The Russians
have a perfect record, they have never repaid any loan, " Stone said
as he criticized the twenty-year, $400 million deal slated to send 80
million tons of phosphate to the Soviet Union at fixed subsidized
prices. 2
This article examines the political controversy that surrounded
the 1974 Occidental-Soviet phosphate deal in an effort to highlight
the relationship between Florida phosphate operations, the Soviet
Union, and 1970s Cold War politics. This article begins with an
economic, political, and environmental overview of the Florida
phosphate industry in the 1960s and early 1970s, and describes
events leading to the penning of the controversial 1974 deal. 3 Next,
it examines Richard Stone's and other critics' accusations that the
deal threatened the Florida environment, advanced Soviet industrial technology, was backed by American taxpayers, and provided
an essential finite agricultural commodity and a potential weapon
to the Soviets. It also chronicles how-to detente opponents' chagrin-the deal linked Florida phosphate to Cuban sugar production
and other socialist nations' agricultural and industrial economies. 4
2

3
4

Rhonda Downs, "Phosphate Industry Key," Tampa Tribune, December 11 , 1974;
Tom Fiedler, "Is it time for more taxes on Phosphate?" St. Petersburg Times, April
17, 1977; Bud Newman, "Stone Says Taxpayers Pay for Soviet Deal," Tampa
Tribune, April 12, 1974.
Along with Florida phosphate imports, the deal also included Soviet ammonia,
potash, and urea exports to the U.S.
The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) was a Soviet Unionbacked economic organization that connected various socialist economies. It
existed from 1949 to 1991, and Cuba officially became a member in 1972. For
a concise description of Cuba's role in Com econ, see Julia E. Sewig, Cuba: What
Everyone Needs to Know, 2nd Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014),
70-71. For a look at the broader relationship between Comecon and the Cold
War "global south," see Sara Lorenzini, "Comecon and the South in the Years
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This article's final section examines the Carter Administration's
1979 decision to halt Florida phosphate shipments in response to
the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan and President Reagan's
rescinding of Carter's embargo, a decision made at the behest of
neoliberal market ideals, domestic political pressures, and declining phosphate production and profits.
A few historians, most notably Scott Hamilton Dewey, have
written excellent histories about Florida phosphate industry pollution, domestic politics, and post-World War II U.S. environmentalism, while some earlier Cold War-era works, like Frederick Blakey's
1973 study, examine the overall growth, development, and technological advancements of the industry from its inception to 1970. 5
These scholars, however, have not studied the controversy surrounding the Soviet-Occidental deal and the nationalistic thread
of phosphate industry criticism it spawned, nor has a more general
history of the post-1970 Florida phosphate industry been written.6
With this in mind, this study fills-in part- a historiographical gap

5

6

of Detente. A Study on East-South Economic Relations," European Review of History 21, no. 2 (2014): 183-199. Alo see William V Wallace and Roger A. Clarke,
Comecon, Trade, and the West (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986) and Adam
Zwass, The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance: The Thorny Path from Political to
Economic Integration (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1989).
Scott Dewey's work examines Florida phosphate's air pollution issues. Scott
Hamilton Dewey, Don't Breathe the Air: Air Pollution and U.S. Environmental Politics, 1945-1970 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 175-254;
Scott Hamilton Dewey, "Is Thi What We Came Here For?: Florida Women
and the Fight Against Air Pollution in the 1960s," Florida Historical Quarterly
77, no. 4 (Spring 1999): 503-531. Fredric Blakey's work is the only book solely
dedicated to examining Florida phosphate industry history, and it was published before the Occidental-Soviet deal was public. Fredric Blakey, The Florida
Phosphate Industry: A History of the Development and Use of a Vital Mineral (Boston,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1973) . For earlier studies of the industry, see
Lewis D. Harris, "The Florida Phosphate Industry and Air PoUution" (M.A.
Thesis, Florida State University, 1967); H.T. Grace, "A Regional Study of the
Phosphate Indu try," The Quarterly journal of the Florida Academy of Science XVII,
no. 168 (September 1954); William W. Orr, "The History of the Phosphate
Industry in Florida' (MA. Thesis, Stetson University, 1963) . For a concise look
at Florida's postwar phosphate industry, see Gary Mormino, Land of Sunshine,
State ofDreams: A Social History of Modern Florida (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2005), 215-219.
Many scientific and technical papers about the post-1973 phosphate industry
have been written. None of these papers, however, examine the Soviet-Occidental deal. For examples of postwar technical/scientific studies of Florida
phosphate, see Stephen M. Jasinski, "Phosphate Rock," U.S. Geological Survey Minerals Yearbook, 2004, 56.1-56. l 0 and Casey Beavers, 'An Overview of
Phosphate Mining and Operations in Florida," University of Florida, April
2013.
http: // oils .ifas.ufl.edu/ docs/pdf/ academic/papers/beavers_casey_
no_embargo.pdf, (accessed October 28, 2015).
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by exploring the deal that made Florida phosphate a detente-era
political hot potato and a commodity in both the Western and Eastern blocs.
Finally, this article endeavors to contribute to existing global
fertilizer and Cold War-era trade historiography. Gregory Cushman, Rory Miller, and others have highlighted how fertilizer, in
the form of guano, connected the western coast of South America
to the 'Pacific World' and the industrialization of Europe. 7 These
studies reveal how guano's commodification connected distinct
and disparate geographical regions, political structures, and people, linking them into webs of interdependence. 8 As was the case
with guano, detente-era Florida phosphate rock connected distant
environments, political systems, peoples, and industries. The Occidental-Soviet deal examined here linked the vast Soviet economic empire-which stretched from Siberia to Vietnam, Cuba, and
beyond-to Florida's rural regions, port cities, politicians, aquifer,
and industrial workers. This article therefore complements previous historical works that have highlighted how the fertilizer trade
shaped global, environmental, and political history. In regards to
Cold War-trade historiography, this work supports Philip Funigiello 'sand other scholars' arguments that Henry Kissinger and other
detente proponents hoped that economic trade with and technological development of the Soviet Union's non-military economy
would provoke Soviet elites to divert resources from the USSR's
military complex to its domestic economy. The Occidental-Soviet
deal, however, broadens and complicates historical understandings
regarding the Reagan Administration's policies on East-West trade.
Although the Reagan Administration publicly stated it would block
technology and industrial exchanges with the Soviets, this did not
apply to Florida phosphate. This proved true in spite of the largescale industrial infrastructure and technology involved in the Occidental-Soviet deal. Florida phosphate was instead lumped in with
Reagan's lifting of grain sales to the Soviet Bloc. Thus, this study
highlights the Reagan Administration's dedication to appeasing
7

8

Gregory T. Cushman, Guano and the opening of the Pacific World: A Global Ecological History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Rory M . Miller
and Robert Greenhill, 'The Fertilizer Commodity Chains: Guano and Nitrate,"
in From Silver to Cocaine: Latin American Commodity Chains and the Building of
the World Economy, 1500-2000, eds. Steven Topik, Carlos Marichal, and Zephyr
Frank (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), 228-270.
Ted Steinberg, Down to Earth: Nature 's Role in American History, 3rd Edition
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), xi.
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the U.S. agricultural lobby even if it meant phosphate-based technology and industrial exchanges with the "Evil Empire." Lastly, this
article illustrates how the Occidental-Soviet agreement, in a roundabout way, linked Florida phosphate to Cuba's sugar industry and
other Eastern Bloc economies, a connection not yet examined by
Cold War trade historians. 9
Although only a small fraction of the Florida phosphate rock
mined in the 1970s and 1980s was shipped to the Soviet Union,
the Occidental-Soviet deal engendered an intense political debate
over the nation's phosphate resources. This detente-era nationalistic, critical thread surfaced in 1974 and dissolved in the early 1980s,
when Florida phosphate -production and profits declined and
thousands of Florida workers were laid off. This article attempts to
recover this detente-era history in an effort to highlight the political and economic connections that bound the Florida phosphate
industry to nations and markets throughout the world. The story
of the Occidental-Soviet Florida phosphate deal is a political, environmental, and transnational one that is replete with Cold War
intrigue.
The Economic, Environmental, and Political Consequences of
Florida Phosphate Industry Growth in the 1960s and early 1970s
In the late 1940s and 1950s Florida phosphate production
boomed, as the global demand for industrial fertilizers spiked. As
a result, more and more Florida earth was mined and deeper ship
channels were dredged to accommodate the steadily growing number and size of phosphate exporting vessels crowding Tampa and
other Florida ports. 10 During these boom years phosphate companies, like the International Mineral and Chemical Corporation,
9

10

Philip J. Funigiello, American-Soviet Trade in the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 183, 194-195, 197-198, 224. Funigello's book
has a particularly helpful and concise bibliographic essay on pre-1988 detente
works, see 277-279. Also, see Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation:
American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, Revised Edition, (Washington,
DC: Brookings Press, 1994). For a recent overview of detente politics, see Jussi
M. Hanhimaki, The Rise and Fall ofDetente: American Foreign Policy and the Transformation of the Cold War (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2013) . For an examination of the relationship between Western Europe and Comecon during the
1970s, see Takeshi Yamamoto, "Detente or Integration? EC Response to Soviet
Policy Change towards the Common Market, 1970-75," Cold War History 7, no.
1 (March 2007): 75-94.
Although phosphate was shipped from a few different Florida ports, the vast
majority of the state's mined phosphate was shipped out of Port Tampa in the
decades after World War IL
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invested millions in their Florida phosphate operations, while marketing initiatives in South Korea and in other distant corners of
the globe developed new phosphate consumers. By the end of the
1950s, phosphate was the third largest industry in the state, behind
only tourism and agriculture, and Florida phosphate linked the
state's phosphate mining lands, port cities, and industrial workers
to the postwar global marketplace to a greater extent than ever
before. While Florida postwar suburbs mushroomed and plans
were hatched for theme parks and professional sports franchises,
industrial phosphate grew. 11
As Florida phosphate operations expanded, however, so did
concern over industry air and water pollution. Tampa Bay-area
politicians complained about phosphate dust that wafted off transporting trains. Tampa motorists complained that the trains crawled
through the city twelve times a day, causing major traffic jams. A
1965 Newsweek magazine story chronicled the clouds of phosphate
dust that drifted "across Tampa Bay and bathed neighboring
homes .. .in layers of fine white powder," and accused the phosphate trains of making "shambles" out of downtown traffic. But the
industry contributed $60 million to the city's economy and phosphate boosters argued that if mining operations were curtailed,
the city "could become a ghost town" and the Florida economy
would be damaged. Nevertheless, environmentalists complained
about the pollution emitted by the industry. Hillsborough County
Commissioner Carl Carpenter argued that phosphate dam breaks
that polluted the Peace River and other Florida waterways were
no accident. "It's no secret that dam breaks occur just when it best
serves the phosphate industry," Carpenter said in 1964. Citing a
1960s dam break that resulted in a widespread Peace River fish
kill, Carpenter argued that costly fines and government mandated
cleanups for such so-called accidents would motivate the industry
to curtail pollution. Anti-pollution activists from Polk and other

11

"There are many reasons for Tampa's climbing into the big league shippingwise but among the most important is increased efficiency at dockside," Tampa
Tribune, June 15, 1958; Blakey, The Florida Phosphate Industry: A History of the
Development and Use of a Vital Mineral, 90-103; Bill Boyd and photos by Ed Sessions, "World Shipments of Phosphate Bring Boom to Tampa's Busting Port"
and "Phosphate Shipments Bring Boom to Tampa; Record Cargoes Seen,"
Tampa Morning Tribune, April 1, 1951; "Rotarians Hear Speaker Tell of Phosphate Rise," Tampa Daily Times, August 13, 1954; "Record Phosphate Load,"
Tampa Tribune, June 11, 1958; "Shipments of Phosphate From Tampa Said
Gaining," Tampa Tribune,June 15, 1958.
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Phosphate being loaded onto a ship in Port Tampa in 1958. Note the dust cloud.
Courtesy of State Archives of Florida, Florida Memory Photographic Collection,
photo by Donald J. Marks, Don and Gladys Marks Collection, N2013-l 7, Box #1,
image number DGM0290.

Florida counties threatened by phosphate pollution also criticized
the industry. 12
Although concerned Floridians, environmentalists, politicians,
and competing business interests worked to combat the industry's
air and water pollution in the 1960s and 1970s, phosphate pollutants continued to plague the state. In response, Floridians like
Harriet N. Lightfoot publicly complained, along with government
officials like Carpenter, about the air pollution caused by phosphate
operations and demanded that something be done. 13 They argued
that air pollutants poisoned the Central Florida sky, threatening
the health of humans, cattle, and orange groves. In 1970, Nathaniel Reed, Florida Governor Claude Kirk's environmental advisor,
called Florida phosphate companies the "bad boys of pollution
control" and challenged the industry to stop the "God awful cloud
that occurs when acid and ammonia plants mix emissions." Others
12

13

Tampa Port Authority Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1969, Archived at the Hills borough County John F. German Public Library; "Ports: Tempest in Tampa," Newsweek, November 22, 1965; Frank Bentayou, "County Eyes Rules For Phosphate
Mining," Tampa Tribune, February 8, 1964; James Walker, "Phosphate Firms
Told To Shape Up," Tampa Tribune, January 28, 1970.
Dewey, "Is This What We Came Here For?" 513-520.
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focused on the water pollution emitted by the industry. In 1971,
two billion gallons of industrially polluted water turned a 75-mile
stretch of the Peace River into a "chalkish gray" industrial sewer,
and thousands of fish were killed as the polluted water snaked its
way to the Gulf of Mexico. Episodes like this drew the ire of local
environmental groups, particularly the Florida Defenders of the
Environment (FDE). The FDE, which was established in 1969 and
had lobbied to stop the ill-fated Cross Florida Barge Canal, was
one of the industry's most persistent critics, and the organization
worked to curtail industry pollution and, in particular, block phosphate operations from expanding into the Osceola National Forest. Despite such criticisms, however, phosphate companies, their
pollutants, and the industry's environmental footprint continued
to expand. 14
The economic reality was that phosphate mining and related
fertilizer production was big business in Florida. Thus, it proved
difficult to regulate and curb the pollution emitted by the state 's
third largest industry. Even though Hillsborough County had the
highest air pollution levels in the state, and the industry generated millions of tons of industrial slime that was stored in openair settling ponds throughout phosphate mining areas, operations
expanded. While proposed solutions to eradicating the industry's
open-air slime ponds included pumping their contents into the
Everglades or storing the slime underground, the industry continued to expand, creating more and more slime ponds and other
environmental hazards. Florida residents ·also feared that the
industry was depleting the state's aquifer. But Florida phosphate
companies were mining approximately 1/ 3 of the world's phosphate, and in the first half of the 1970s, their profits were soaring. In 1974, 35 million tons of Florida phosphate was shipped
to locations throughout the world, and a reported 61,000 workers
14

The FDE was primarily concerned with blocking proposed phosphate mining in the Osceola Forest and protecting the Suwannee River. Walker, "Phospliate Firms Told To Shape Up," Tampa Tribune, January 28, 1970; Bob Brink,
"Bureau of Mines Expects End to Retention Dams," Tampa Tribune, March 29,
1974; "Detergent, phosphate curbs set," Tampa Times, December 1, 1972. For a
look at the FDE's creation and anti-canal platform, see Steven Noll and David
Tegeder, Ditch ofDreams: The Cross Florida Barge Canal and the Struggle for Florida's
Future (Gainesville: Uniyersity Press of Florida, 2009), 217-219; Phosphate Leasing on the Osceola National Forest in Florida, Department of the Interior, Int. FES
74-37, 1974, IX-86. In 1984 the FDE published a sourcebook on Florida phosphate operations: Phosphate Mining in Florida: A Sourcebook, (Tallahassee, FL:
Environmental Service Center, 1984).
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/"Map of phosphate rock locations in Florida. Map provided by author.

were employed either directly or indirectly by the industry. Florida
phosphate was a polluter, but economic and geological realities
dictated that phosphate mining would not disappear or relocate
overnight. 15
It was in this economic, political, and environmental climate
that the International Mineral and Chemical Company proposed
building an $80 million fertilizer plant near the Hillsborough-Polk
County line, and the Brewster Phosphate Company requested that
an 18,000 acre parcel be rezoned for phosphate mining in Hillsborough County. These plans were made public in 1973, just months
15

For a thorough examination of the Florida phosphate industry from the end
of World War II to 1970 and, in particular, industry air pollution and the
intertwining interests of residents, businesses, and federal, local, and state
governments, see Dewey, Don't Breathe the Air, 175-254. "Phosphate: A thriving
threatened giant," Tampa Tribune, November 9, 1975; Archie Blount, "Phosphate industry fears pollution controls," Tampa Times, June 5, 1972; Morris
Kennedy, "Slime disposal proves to be difficult problem," Tampa Times, June
5, 1974, 1-F; Downs, "Phosphate Industry Key," Tampa Tribune, December 11,
1974.
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before the details of the Occidental-Soviet deal were publicized.
Both plans drew criticism from environmentalists,' residents, and
local politicians. The proposed plant, according to International's
application, would produce 600,000 tons of phosphate-based fertilizer a year and emit 24,000 pounds of sulfur dioxide, 900 pounds of
acid mist, 3,345 pounds of dust, and 323.4 pounds of fluoride per
day. Hillsborough County environmental engineer Dorian Valdes
complained the application looked like it was "prepared by a sixyear old" and that it contained "sketchy unscientific information."
Others were concerned about the plant's water usage. The industry had traditionally drawn tremendous amounts of water from
Florida's aquifer for use in industrial processing, and opponents
feared that the new mining operation and fertilizer plant would
increase water usage immensely. 16
Residents of southern Hillsborough County vowed to fight
Brewster's rezoning efforts, and they succeeded initially. Not far
from the proposed mine was Sun City, a sprawling post-industrial
suburb for retired persons. Some of the community's residents
feared that the industrial phosphate operations threatened their
leisure-oriented suburban homes and lifestyle. With its golf courses, small affordable homes, and restaurants, the neighborhood was
a retreat for retirees, many of them relocating to Sun City from
northern industrial cities. Earl Taton, the president of the Sun
City homeowners association, fought the rezoning proposal. "We
don't want the mining out here at all," Taton told the press. He
argued the industry taxed the local water supplies, which should
be reserved for expanding suburban communities. One source
argued that the industry would use seven million gallons of water
per day. The Hillsborough County Commission initially sided with
Taton and other concerned residents. It turned down the industry's rezoning bid and zoned the land for agricultural use only
instead. The Tampa Tribune reported, "One of the main reasons
given by the commission for the reactions was the belief that the
mining would further deplete the already inadequate supplies of
water in the region." 17
16

17

Walker, "Hillsborough is Upset Over Phosphate Plant," Tampa Tribune, April
20, 1973; Bob Brink, "Phosphate Firm Disputes Stand on Mining Deal," Tampa
Tribune, December 28, 1 ~73; Richard Dodge, "Civic leaders vow fight against
mining in country," Tampa Times, January 4, 1974; "Water woes seen in strip
mine plan," Tampa Times, October 20, 1973.
Dodge, "Civic leaders vow fight against mining in country," Tampa Times, January 4, 1974; Brink, "Phosphate Firm Disputes Stand on Mining Deal," Tampa
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The issue, however, proved far from settled. The Florida
Farm Bureau was one organization that came to the defense of the
industry. Farm Bureau President J.E. McLean, Jr. supported the
proposed mining operating, citing the economic benefits of phosphate mining. A local Florida peanut farmer did as well, arguing
that his land on a former phosphate mine was more fertile. Other
farmers cited the rising cost of the phosphate-based fertilizer they
used. From late 1972 to mid-197 4, the price of phosphate had
tripled .18 This was putting a pinch on farmers, particularly cattle
ranchers, as beef prices had fallen during the same period. Cattle
ranchers needed fertilizer for- heir pastures and animal feed. They
reasoned: wouldn 't a new mining operation help reduce the cost of
phosphate? Brewster officials noted that they planned to reclaim
the land after the mining operations ceased. They also argued that
a new reclamation process permitted faster solidification of the settling slim ponds, thus allowing for quicker land reclamation . James
L. Cox of International Mining Corporation also lobbied hard for
the new operations. While admitting that the industry had been
guilty of wasting water in the past, he argued it now was recycling
water and drawing less from the aquifer. Cox pointed to a study
by the U.S. Geological Survey stating that water levels in the Florida aquifer were rising. He also, in typical industry fashion, highlighted the economic benefits of the proposed plant and mine .
The proposed operations would pump $35 million a year into the
local economy and employ 600 persons, many in high-paying jobs
of $9,000 to $10,000 a year. Finally, Cox played the industry's longstanding ace in the hole, arguing "15 million persons would die of
starvation next year if Florida's phosphate industry was not operating. " Ultimately, Hillsborough County allowed the parcel to be
rezoned in 1974, but not until news of the Occidental-Soviet Deal
went public and became part of the environmental and political
debate over Florida phosphate. 19

18

19

Tribune, December 28, 1973; "Water woes seen in strip mine plan," Tampa
Times, October 20, 1973.
Florida farmer support of the phosphate industry, however, was not unanimous. Farmers with cattle and citrus operations near phosphate facilities had
complained in the 1950s and 1960s that phosphate emissions damaged their
crops and sickened their cattle. Dewey, Don 't Breathe the Air, 195-203 .
In 1974, Hillsborough County did rezone the land for mining, but during
the debate leading up to the rezoning vote, opponents cited the OccidentalSoviet Deal when it became public, stating they didn't think the mine should
be opened in order to send phosphate to the Soviet Union. The phosphate
Occidental had slated for the Soviet Union, however, was not extracted from
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Why Aid the Nation's Ideological Nemesis? The Political Fight
Over the Occidental-Soviet Deal and Florida Phosphate in the
Eastern Bloc

When word spread that the Occidental Oil Company had
penned a deal in early 197 4 to send Florida phosphate to the Soviet
Union, Cold War politics became part of the debate surrounding
the Florida phosphate industry. News of the Occidental-Soviet deal
created a new nationalistic thread of phosphate industry criticism.
This nationalistic thread shared the concerns of environmentalists,
suburbanites, and the politicians who criticized Brewster, International, and other phosphate companies for being environmental
spoilers and tax evaders. But in addition, this thread argued that
Florida phosphate was a finite national resource that should be
preserved and reserved for domestic use. It also contended that the
Florida environment should not be compromised in order to send
phosphate to the nation's Cold War enemy. The Occidental-Soviet
deal for these nationalists reeked of phosphate industry-particularly Occidental-self-interest and anti-Americanism.
Occidental head Dr. Armand Hammer, who had long ties to
the Soviet Union, brokered the Soviet phosphate deal. Hammer's
Soviet connections stretched back to Vladimir Lenin's New Economic Policy. In the 1920s, the Hammer family helped broker a
series of Soviet-U.S. economic deals involving numerous American
businesses, including the Ford Motor Company. Under the terms
of these agreements, U.S. tractors, machinery, and other equipment were shipped to the newly formed Soviet Union. Armand
Hammer even resided in Russia for much of the 1920s, and though
he left the USSR during the early years of Stalinization, he was able
to continue his Soviet business deals for decades. 20
Hammer traveled to Moscow on business for much of his career
and kept an apartment within walking distance of the Kremlin after

20

.this mine but from their White Springs operation in North Florida instead.
Richard Dodge, "Farm bureau sees benefit in mining area phosphate," Tampa
Times, February 21, 1974; Peggy Shaw, "Cut in phosphate supplies hurting
ranchers in area," Tampa Times, April 1, 1974; Morris Kennedy, "Controls cut
water waste in thirsty mining process," Tampa Times, June 7, 1974; Debbie
Stoudt, "Mining Zoning Approved by Planning Board," Tampa Tribune, July
23, 1974; Morris Kennedy, "Radiation monitor asked," Tampa Times, July 22,
1974; Brink, "Phosphate Firm Disputes Stand on Mining Deal," Tampa Tribune,
December 28, 1973.
.
Edward Epstein, "The Riddle of Armand," New York Times, November 9, 1981.
For a critical view of Dr. Armand Hammer and Occidental, see Edward Epstein,
Dossier: The Secret History of Armand Hammer (New York: Random House, 1996) .
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World War II. In 1961, he had a meeting with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev that laid the foundation for the Occidental-Soviet
phosphate deal. At this meeting, Khrushchev told Hammer that
the Soviet Union needed billions of dollars' worth of phosphatebased fertilizer in order to increase food production. A longtime
advocate and broker for Soviet-U.S. trade, Hammer was willing to
oblige and used his Occidental Oil Company to acquire Florida
phosphate lands. Along with land acquisition, Occidental purchased the International Ore and Fertilizer Corporation (at the
time the largest fertilizer company in the U.S.), the Best Fertilizer
Company, the Jefferson Lake Sulphur Company, and the Hooker
Chemical Company. Through these acquisitions and other business maneuverings, Hammer transformed Occidental from an oil
and gas company into an oil, gas, and fertilizer company in the
1960s. The Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev's fall from power,
the Vietnam War, and other Cold War manifestations and tensions
thwarted potential phosphate deals between Occidental and the
Soviet Union in the 1960s, but the Nixon administration's detente
policy opened the door for a Soviet-Occidental phosphate deal in
the early 1970s. 21
When the Occidental-Soviet deal was made public, opponents
howled and compared it to the infamous 1972 U.S.-Soviet grain
deal. Under the terms of the publicly decried grain deal, U.S.
farmers sold $750 million worth of U.S. grain to the Soviet Union
at subsidized prices. Labeling it the "Great Grain Robbery," critics
said the deal dramatically raised grain prices in U.S. markets. One
reporter described the grain deal as "a good example of how separate U.S. economic and political interests can interact to produce
a plan beneficial to none of these interests." 22 Although Occidental
21
22

Epstein, Dossier, 204-210.
Mark]. Penn, "America Gets the Shaft," Harvard Crimson, November 16, 1973.
According to a report by Schnittker Associates, the Soviets bought $750 million worth of U.S. grain, which made up a quarter of the 1972-1973 wheat crop.
Though Schnittker cites five other conditions that led to increased grain prices
in U.S. markets, he concluded, "when news of the Soviet purchases spread
through the grain world and domestic shortages began to appear, wheat prices
doubled. Because the Soviets bought early and at low prices, the American
consumer rather than the Russian government had to pay high prices. About
one-half the beef inflation and $200 million in higher bread costs can be
traced to the market effects of the Soviet grain deal ." John A. Schnittker, "The
1972-1973 Food Price Spiral," report by Schnittker Associates prepared for the
U.S. Congressional Joint Economic Committee, 1973, 498-507. For an early
critical examination of the grain deal, see Jam es Trager, The Great Grain Robbery
(New York: Ballantine Books, 1975).
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said that the phosphate deal would not pinch U.S. consumers' wallets, many saw it as a sweetheart deal for Florida phosphate and
the Soviet Union. The deal guaranteed a 20-year market for Occidental and included a $180 million taxpayer-backed loan. Critics
of International's proposed fertilizer plant and Brewster's Hillsborough County mining proposal argued that they did not want
industrial operations in their backyards to supply phosphate to the
Soviet Union. Even though these opponents were assured that the
phosphate from International and Brewster's proposed operations
would not be heading to the Eastern Bloc, the political backlash
stemming from the Occidental-Soviet deal sparked a Congressional inquiry and a lawsuit as rumors of OPEC-like industry tactics
swirled. 23
When the Occidental-Soviet deal was announced, the phosphate industry was already defending itself from accusations that
it was akin to OPEC, and the deal quickly became a part of this
narrative. One industry critic said that American phosphate corporations "with the Moslem nation [Morocco] , may well have been
the most successful of the main commodities producers that have
aspired to emulate the model of OPEC." Others said Dr. Hammer's
Occidental was in part responsible for the emerging phosphate
cartel, just like it was in part to blame for empowering OPEC. In
the late 1960s, Occidental was involved in a unilateral oil deal with
Libya's Omar Qaddafi. When unable to reach an agreement with
other oil companies in regards to Libyan oil, and because his company was wholly dependent on oil from this North African state,
Hammer broke from standing oil industry practice and brokered
a separate deal with the dictator, prompting one oilman to declare
"the oil industry as we know it would not exist much longer." The
Occidental-Libya deal was accused of emboldening Libya and other
OPEC nations. Opponents alleged it motivated OPEC nations to
separately negotiate with oil companies, thereby pitting the companies against one another, which in turn strengthened OPEC. ·And
now, according to rumors, Moroccan and Florida phosphate producers had privately agreed to increase prices. Whether or not this
was the case, Florida phosphate interests reaped $4 billion in additional profits, according to a French study, thanks to the detenteera spike in phosphate prices, and now Occidental proposed to
23

Newman, "Stone Says Ta.Xpayers Pay for Soviet Deal," Tampa Tribune, April 12,
1974; Bob Brink, "US House Unit to Hear Phosphate Deal Testimony," Tampa
Tribune, April 21, 1974.
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ship Florida phosphate to the Soviet Union at subsidized prices.
The specter of a Morocco-Florida cabal was a political problem for
the industry, and the anti-trust division of the Justice Department
launched an investigation into industry price-fixing .24
Florida Secretary of State Richard Stone was a vociferous critic
of the Occidental-Soviet deal. In particular, he condemned the
deal's $ 180 million taxpayer-backed Export-Import bank loan.
Along with calling Russia an untrustworthy debtor and U.S. taxpayers suckers, Stone said that the $180 million loan violated the bank's
mandate. 25 "The Export-Import Bank is supposed to be for responsible developing nations and Russia is neither a developing nation
nor a responsible debtor," he argued. Why, he asked incredulously,
should American taxpayers be compelled to financially back and
subsidize Soviet industrial development? "It is amazing that the
United States would extend loans to an adversary like Russia at six
percent interest when the prime rate in New York is 10 percent.. .
the people that brought you the great grain robbery now are bringing you the phosphate deal." Stone also argued that domestic food
prices would rise because of the deal, like they had after the grain
deal, and that Florida's environment would be imperiled. With
all this in mind, Stone told reporters that he personally wrote Dr.
Hammer asking questions about the deal. As of April 1974, he had
yet to receive a reply.26
Local politicians and environmentalists shared Stone's concerns. They were troubled by the idea that Florida's natural environment and water resources would be degraded and depleted in
order to send phosphate to the Soviet Union. Hillsborough County Commissioner Bob Lester argued that the environment was "suffering at the expense of an operation which has the power roughly
equivalent to the Arab oil-producing nations." The industry's low
tax liability was also cited. Up until 1971, the industry had ·avoided
paying a Florida severance tax levied on industries that extracted
valuable and irreplaceable minerals from the earth. In 1970, the
24

25
26

Ann Crittenden, "White Gold: A Tale Similar to the Oil Saga," Tampa Tribune,
November 9, 1975; Epstein, "The Riddle of Armand." Oilman quote taken
from Judith Stein, PivotalDecade: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance
in the Seventies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 78; "U.S. is Investigating Fertilizer Industry," New York Times, August 9, 1975. For a brief critical
description of the Occidental-Soviet deal, see Epstein, Dossier, 274-276.
The Export-Import Band had never financed a deal involving the Soviet Union
before the Occidental-Soviet deal.
"Taxpayers Financing New Soviet Deal, Stone Says," Lakeland Leger, April 13,
1974.
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Richard Stone in 1977. Courtesy of State Archives of Florida, Florida Memory
Photographic Collection, General Political Collection, image number PT01069.

Florida Supreme Court closed this loophole in the state tax law, yet
industry tax liability was still low due to land reclamation clauses
and because the government had deemed phosphate-owned land
yet to be mined "agricultural" under the state's Greenbelt law. 27
27

Florida phosphate companies often rented their unmined land holdings to
farmers in part to maintain the land's agricultural status for tax purposes. This
allowed phosphate companies to keep their land on the tax rolls for as little
as $25 an acre, a practice that enraged industry opponents. The legal fight
over the phosphate industry's use of the Greenbelt Law was tied up in the
court system well into the 1980s. See Walden v. Borden 235 So.2d 300 (1970);
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Sharing these concerns, Richard Stone demanded the terms
of the deal be publicly disclosed. When denied this request, he
filed a lawsuit against the Export-Import Bank. The bank, Stone
argued in the suit, was a public taxpayer-funded entity, therefore
U.S. citizens had the right under the Freedom of Information Act
to review the full loan agreement. Export-Import Bank Chairman
William]. Casey countered that the loan was a confidential agreement between the private corporate parties involved and that some
of the said parties did n0- consent to disclosure. 28 Furthermore,
he argued, private parties were exempt from the Freedom of Information Act. After a district court ruled in the bank's favor, Stone
appealed. He stated that the_-bank and the companies involved
were not persons as defined in the Freedom of Information Act
and therefore the exemption did not apply to them. Stone argued
tha t the exemption was intended to protect the privacy of American citizens and U.S.-based businesses, not the privacy of entities
involved in a transnational business deal linking Florida phosphate
operations to Soviet industrial production and infrastructure. The
courts disagreed, and Stone's appeals were exhausted by 1977.
The deal's full details remained veiled. 29
Along with the lawsuit, Stone questioned the deal at a 1974
Congressional subcommittee hearing. At this hearing, he raised
five concerns about the deal, both reinforcing and elaborating on
his earlier criticisms. First, he argued that there was no guarantee
that the Soviets would not use Florida phosphate in weapons production. Stone told the committee that Florida State University
chemistry professor Robert Glick told him "superphosphoric acid
can chemically be converted to phosphorus, and that phosphorus
can be used in the making of pyrotechnic safety matches, incendiary shells, smoke bombs and tracer bullets." It could also be used
to make poisonous gas. "I believe there should be assurances from
the Soviet Union that [Florida] phosphate will be used for agricultural purposes and not military purposes," Stone testified. Second, he argued that strip mining phosphate for the Soviet Union

28
29

Catherine Chapin, "Miners Face Water Crisis," Tampa Tribune, May 8, 1975;
J ack Nease, "Phosphate Firms Hit U.S. Study," Tampa Tribune, March 16, 1976;
Bill Purvis, "Phosphate Industry Says it Pays 'Fair Share' of Taxes," Tampa Tribune, January 29, 1969; Charles Hendrick, "Florida Supreme Court Closes Tax
Loophole of Phosphate Companies," Tampa Tribune, May 7, 1970; Rich Oppel,
"State Supreme Court Ruling on Greenbelt Law May Raise Taxes," Daytona
Beach Morning]ourna~ May 7, 1970.
.
There were in fact numerous American businesses involved in the deal.
Stone v. Export-Import Bank of United States 552 F. 2d 132 (1977).
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would further strain Florida's resources. The industry was already
extracting millions of gallons from the Florida aquifer and taxing
the state's energy infrastructure. Occidental already consumed tremendous amounts of energy, including 20,992,580 kilowatt hours
per month at its Phosphate Division plant. The Soviet deal would
increase this energy as well as water use. Thirdly, Stone questioned
whether the Soviet ammonia slated for importation should instead
be manufactured in the U.S. Fourthly, he said that the nation
should be concerned about depleting its phosphate reserves. If
those who were predicting peak Florida phosphate in the next 30
to 40 years were correct, why should Florida send such large quantities to the Soviet Union? Finally, echoing his lawsuit's argument,
Stone criticized the Export-Import Bank loan. He questioned why
the loan's details were not made public and why the loan secured
a 6% interest rate for the Soviets when the interest rate for American taxpayers was over 10%. The loan's terms should be publicly
disclosed via a Congressional order. "Our taxpayers ought to know
the total American Federal Commitment necessary to consummate
this deal; and the American people have the right to know the commitments of their Government to such a transaction," Stone testified. Like his lawsuit, however, Stone's testimony failed to elicit
political action against the deal. 30
Dr. Armand Hammer also spoke at the 197 4 Congressional
hearing. He testified that the Occidental-Soviet Deal and international trade agreements like it were es~entiar to global peace and
prosperity. American businessmen, he argue_d , could assist "our
government in its efforts to achieve a lasting peace between the
world's two greatest powers ... [and] one of the ways to bring this
about was through internationally beneficial trade." Hammer also
contended that deals with the Soviet Union were good for profits
as well. "Russia-if detente survives-will therefore be a new sales
30

Dr. Glick, in a brief statement, also testified about the strain on Florida resourc. es that would be a result of the Occidental-Soviet deal. Role of the Export-Import
Bank and Export Controls in U.S. 1nternational Economic Policy, Congressional
Hearing Before the Senate Subcommittee on International Finance and the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Congressional
Session 93-2 (1974), Hearing Dates April 2, 5, 10, 23, 25-26, May 2, 1974, Statements of Senator Richard Stone and Dr. Armand Hammer, 425-464. This hearing consisted of twenty-one witness panels. The witnesses testified about the
Export-Import Bank, Cold War detente, and various business dealings between
American corporations and other nations, including the Occidental-Soviet
phosphate deal. For a brief overview of Senator Stone's testimony, see Richard
Stone, "Testimony on Phosphate Exporting," St. Petersburg Times, January 10,
1977.
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territory for Americans, opening markets that will be plentiful,"
not just for Occidental, but for other American businesses as well.
Hammer noted that ten private banks, including the Bank of America, and approximately one hundred small American firms were
involved in the deal. He also pointed out that though the ExportImport Bank was providing a low interest loan to the Soviet Union,
the Russians were also fronting $40 million cash for the deal. The
private entities involved were also eager to work with the Soviet
Union and were trusting Q.fits credit worthiness. Hammer went on
in his lengthy statement to describe the already existing business
ties between the Soviet Union and important American Cold War
allies.Japan, the United Kingdom, and France all had commercial
ties to the Soviet Union that- ~ere backed by low-interest government loans. Taking a page from the broader Florida phosphate
industry's script, Hammer also testified that the deal would create
3,000 new American jobs and potentially thwart widespread starvation. Furthermore, he noted that Occidental would be investing $340 million of its own capital in order to expand its Florida
phosphate infrastructure. Finally, Hammer argued that importing
ammonia and urea from the Soviets was energy efficient, there
were extensive phosphate reserves in Florida, it was economically
unfeasible for the Soviet Union to manufacture chemical weapons
with Occidental phosphate, and the company would reclaim mined
land. "The alternatives are fa~too awful to contemplate-fear, famine, pestilence, small wars, more Vietnams, cold wars, and even the
potential for nuclear war." His testimony proved persuasive. 31
With the Congressional hurdles cleared and the lawsuit stymied, Occidental began its Soviet trade, investing in new infrastructure in both Florida and the Soviet Union. Occidental built four
new ammonia plants, a 1,500 mile pipeline, and ammonia-handling facilities in the Soviet Union. In 1977, Occidental upveiled
plans to expand its phosphate operations in White Springs, Florida, and enhance its shipping facilities. Millions of dollars were
slated for upgrading mining and shipping infrastructure as well
as Jacksonville's port facilities. Before the Occidental-Soviet Deal,
Jacksonville's port only handled dry cargo, but now the port would
be outfitted to handle concentrated superphosphoric acid imports
to the Soviet Union. Incoming Soviet ammonia and urea would
m turn be sent to Tampa and distributed throughout Florida.
31

Rol,e of the Export-Import Bank and Export Controls in U.S.° International Economic
Policy, Congressional hearing (1974), Statement of Armand Hammer, 445-464.
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Three years later, Occidental's new Swift Creek Chemical Complex in North Florida was dedicated. This complex was part of a
$245 million project that also included new storage facilities at the
Jacksonville port, two chemical plants, and new mining endeavors.
The Florida Secretary of Agriculture attended the dedication and
Occidental provided tours of the new facility while critics grumbled the deal had driven twenty-nine U.S. ammonia plants out of
production. 32
The deal 's imports, exports, and new infrastructure did not
only link Florida phosphate to industrial operations in the Soviet
Republics, but, thanks to Comecon, Florida phosphate was made
available in various forms for distribution to socialist nations
throughout the world, including Cuba. Cuba's primary economic
role as a Comecon member in the 1970s was to produce as much
sugar as possible for the socialist bloc. In an attempt to accomplish this, the island developed a state-run, Soviet-style agricultural
system, and the Soviet Union agreed to pay inflated, fixed prices for Cuban sugar. The result, one historian has argued, was "a
skyrocketing in the price premium paid by the Soviet Union" for
Cuban sugar, and in 1981, Cuba signed an agreement to be the
primary sugar supplier for the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and the German Democratic Republic. The fertilizer needed for this intensive
and industrial agricultural endeavor was not produced in Cuba.
Instead, it was the Soviet Union that provided low-cost fertilizer
and fuel to the island. Thus, although Floridians were not sweetening their coffees and cookies with Cuban sugar, the Occidental-Soviet deal linked Florida phosphate to Comecon's industrial,
transnational agricultural system, a system that sweetened the desserts of Russians, East Germans, and other Eastern Bloc inhabitants
with Cuban sugar. 33

32 · Jeff Nesmith, "Ammonia Aid to Russia Closes Plants in U.S.," Miami News, April
21, 1979; "Soviet Sale Pushes Occidental to Expand," Lakeland Ledger, July 16,
1977; John Druckenmiller, "5,000 Expected at Occidental Plant Dedication,"
Lakeland Ledger, April 10, 1980; Spencer Rich, "Soviets Dumping Ammonia,"
Washington Post, October 4, 1979.
33 Cuban fertilizer imports were reduced by over 80% after the fall of the Soviet
Union. Cuban nickel was another important commodity exported to the Eastern Bloc. Louis A. Perez, Cuba Between Reform and Revolution 51.h Edition, (New
York: Oxford Universit}' Press, 2014), 304; Jorge F. Perez Lopez, The Economics
of Cuban Sugar (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), 11-14,
18, 154; Sweig, Cuba, 68-71; Wallace and Clarke, Comecon, Trade and the West,
98-100; Zwass, The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, 82.
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The Occidental-Soviet deal thereby complemented and ultimately exceeded detente supporters' attempts to create a "flexible
approach" toward Cuba. It also coincided with Cuba's successful
attempt to break its U.S.-sponsored political and economic Latin
American isolation. As Chile, Argentina, Peru, and other nations
reestablished economic ~and diplomatic relations with Cuba in the
early 1970s, the U.S. did not block these reconciliations. The U.S.
even supported the Organization of American States' (OAS) decision to rescind Cuban economic and political sanctions, and select
U.S. goods were sold to the island via third-party corporations.
Ultimately, however, Cuban and American political priorities- in
particular Cuban military aid
the leftist People's Movement for
the Liberation of Angola (MPIA), Cuban support for Puerto Rican
independence, both U.S. and Cuban ambivalence toward restoring relations between one another, and the bombing of Cubana
Airlines Flight 455-thwarted the renewing of diplomatic relations
and a lifting of the embargo. The Occidental-Soviet deal, however,
circumvented the embargo and created indirect economic links
between Cuba and the U.S. via Comecon. 34
With its Eastern Bloc ties established, Occidental and the
broader Florida phosphate industry seemed posed to continue
their profitable expansions at the dawn of the 1980s. "The industry concluded the 1970s with a rash of announcements relating
to plant construction or exp-ansion, diversification into the extraction of uranium from phosphate, and also unveiling plans and
receiving permits for new mines," wrote industry observer Harry
Costello. The Florida phosphate industry employed 72,000, and
its average annual wage was $15,800 in 1979, considerably higher
than the average salary in Florida. The Florida Phosphate Council
reported that its eighteen member companies had spent $1.26 billion in industry infrastructure in the 1970s- a sum 2.5 times more
than the cost of Walt Disney World. Experts predicted that by 1985,
the industry would extract 60 million tons of phosphate rock a year.
The industry was also investing in technology that would allow it to
mine phosphate deposits that were previously unextractable. New
technologies were investigated, one of which involved injecting
high-pressured water into deeply buried phosphate, transforming
it into slurry, and then pumping it to the surface for processing.

to

34

Sweig, Cuba, 89-93; William M. LeoGrande and Peter kornbluh, Back Channel
to Cuba: The Hidden History of Negotiations Between Washington and Havana (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 119-128, 143-153.
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Many prognosticators envisioned an increasingly profitable future
for Florida phosphate, yet concerns over peak phosphate, environmental degradation, and the expansion of overseas phosphate
mining operations loomed, worrying some industry analysts. A U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report stated that peak
Florida phosphate could come as early as 1985, and that Morocco
would produce more and more phosphate in the coming years.
Critical newspaper editorials also continued to be published. The
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, proved to be the biggest
immediate threat to the Occidental-Soviet deal. 35

Detente's End, the Temporary Suspension of Phosphate
Shipments, the Reagan Renewal, and Florida Phosphate's Decline
in the 1980s
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan once again dragged Florida
phosphate into the geopolitical Cold War spotlight, and unlike
Richard Stone's Congressional testimony, the invasion led to a suspension of superphosphoric acid shipments to the Soviet Union.
Fearing that the Afghan government would realign itself with the
U .S. after the killing of Afghan President Nur Mohammad Taraki, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. In
response, President Jimmy Carter argued that the U.S. should "try
to do the maximum, short of world war, to make the Soviets see that
this was a major mistake." In February 1980, the administration
boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympics and blo~ked grain shipments
and other Soviet bound exports, including Occidental phosphate.
George Boutin, the deputy director of the Soviet affairs division at
the Commerce Department, said "I think you can assume what's
going to happen is that someone is going to get out the list of commodities sold to the Soviet Union over the last two years, especially
35

The process of injecting high-pressured water in deeply buried phosphate
deposits was called "dolomitic beneficiation." "Soviet Sale Pushes Occidental
to Expand," Lakeland Ledger, July 16, 1977; Druckenmiller, "5,000 Expected at
Occidental Plant Dedication," Lakeland Ledger, April 10, 1980; Harry Costello,
"Phosphate Future Bright in Florida," Tampa Tribune,January 20, 1980; Charles
Stafford, "Phosphate: Yet Another Dwindling Resource," St. Petersburg Times,
January 23, 1980. For a study that outlines the concern about peak phosphate
and the broader domestic phosphate industry, see the GAO study "Phosphates:
A Case Study of a Valuable, Depleting Mineral in America," Comptroller General Report to the Congress of the United States, EMD-80-21, November 30,
1979; For an example of an anti-Soviet deal editorial, see "Starvation as a Weapon," Sarasota Herald-Tribune, January 16, 1980.Jim Fisher, "Technology Key to
Phosphate," Tampa Tribune, February 12, 1980.
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those of value ... start at the top and go right down. And if that's the
case, phosphate will certainly be high on the list." When the phosphate embargo was enacted, one reporter claimed that the "largest trade transaction ever negotiated between a U .S. corporation
and foreign nation" and one that had been labeled the "flagship of
detente" was in jeopardy. Commerce Secretary Philip M. Klutznick
said the phosphate embargo, which was America's largest non-crop
Soviet export, demonstrated the Carter administration's "refusal to
do business as usual" after the Soviet aggression. Florida Governor
Bob Graham, a longtime critic of Florida phosphate industry pollution, supported the phosphate embargo and the Olympic boycott.
In short, Florida phosphate was once again- with detente now suspended-back in the Cold War political spotlight. 36
Occidental criticized the embargo but ultimately abided its
dictates. James]. Galvin, the president of the Occidental subsidiary Hooker Chemical Corporation, feared that President Carter's
action might provoke the Soviet Union to suspend its ammonia
shipments. This ammonia, he argued, was sorely needed by the
Florida phosphate industry, and its absence could lead to industry
layoffs. Other Occidental officials argued that the embargo would
not damage Soviet agricultural production because the Soviets
could easily secure phosphate-based fertilizers from other suppliers. They insisted the blockade would just damage the Florida
phosphate industry, partic((larly Occidental, as 75% of the phosphate from its White Springs operations was exported to the Soviet
Union. By banning phosphate exports, 1,200 jobs at White Springs
were jeopardized. The manufacturing plants that Occidental had
built in the Soviet Union as part of the deal, as well as the anhydrous
ammonia pipeline, were also threatened, and Occidental feared
these large infrastructure investments could lay dormant. Though
Occidental-Soviet phosphate shipments made up less thah 10% of
Florida's phosphate production, the deal's suspension troubled
36

There was a drastic decrease in overall American-Soviet Trade between 1979
and 1980. U.S. exports were reduced from $3.6 to $1.5 billion and Soviet
imports from $873 million to $430 million. Funigiello, American-Soviet Trade,
208. Clyde H. Farnsworth, "U.S. Bans Phosphate for Soviet," New York Times,
February 26, 1980; For the President Carter quote and for a brief analysis of
1970s U.S. Cold War policy, see Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 316-328. Also see John Lewis
Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin, 2006), 210-211; Tim
Smart, "Embargo May Hurt Florida Phosphate Deal,'" St. Petersburg Times, January 8, 1980; "Graham Would Support Embargo of Phosphates," Tampa Tribune,
January 23, 1980.
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the entire industry and, some argued, Cold War peace efforts. Just
weeks before the embargo's announcement, Armand Hammer
argued inJacksonville that economic ties between the superpowers
would help ensure peace. However, after the embargo was enacted, Hammer said that Occidental would support President Carter's
decision and that it was already preparing to sell in other markets,
namely Brazil, India, and Indonesia. Although Occidental and
other Florida phosphate companies complained, the controversial
"flagship deal of detente" was temporarily stymied. 37
Richard Stone applauded the embargo, but any standing ovations proved ephemeral. Stone supported the phosphate embargo
and advocated for an increase in U.S. defense spending. He also
argued that Soviet ammonia imports to Florida should be blocked.
"We should catch their attention," Stone told reporters, "and take
similar actions against those who won't help us." But Stone's
support for the embargo ultimately failed to persuade incoming
president Ronald Reagan to continue Carter's hardline against
Soviet-U.S. trade. 38
In April 1981, the Reagan Administration lifted the Carter ban
on grain and phosphate exports, fulfilling a campaign promise
to the agricultural lobby. Reagan supporters in the Midwest and
South as well as new Secretary of Agriculture John R. Block advocated a lifting of the embargo, though Secretary of State Alexander
Haig lobbied to keep the embargo in place seeing that the Soviets
were still in Afghanistan. President Reagan, however, "capitulated to pressure from farmers and legislators from grain-producing
states. " 39 In 1984, one American farmer concisely summed up the
collective attitude of many so-called conservative farmers when he
said, "I know how we all feel about the Soviets ... but on the other
hand, I guess they're not going to shoot us with food." Occidental
executives were elated. Company official Gordon Reece said that
the end of the blockade would "have a substantial beneficial effect

37

38
39

Farnsworth, "U.S. Bans Phosphate for Soviet," New York Times, February 26,
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on the American balance of payments and a considerable effect on
the Florida economy. "40
Interestingly, though little mention of it was made at the time,
the resumption of phosphate exports also meant the resumption
of U.S.-Soviet shared industrial technology, which the Reagan
Administration had attempted to thwart in other circumstances.
Concerned with "scientific exchanges," the Reagan Administration blocked export licenses for Soviet-bound electronics and U.S.
corporate involvement in a trans-Siberian natural gas line. The
Occidental-Soviet deal's resumption, however, and the industrial
knowhow incorporated was seemingly ignored, highlighting the
Reagan Administration's unwillingness to block agricultural trade
even if industrial technology was involved. Whatever the reason, it
was clear that during Reagan's presidency Florida phosphate was
free to barter with the Evil Empire. 41
Occidental, the Florida Phosphate Council, and many American farmers and businesses applauded the embargo's end. But
unfortunately, for Occidental and other Florida phosphate companies, the blockade's cessation did not lead to flush times. Beginning
in 1981, industry production and profits dropped sharply. During this period, worldwide sales of chemical fertilizers decreased
substantially. High interest rates and reduced farm revenues
prompted farmers to reduce their fertilizer use. In turn, by mid1981 phosphate production was declining. Phosphate shipments
were down 20% in June, according to the Tampa Port Authority.
This negatively impacted Tampa port business, as phosphate products made up just over half the cargo tonnage that went through
the port in 1980. Phosphate production had increased by 42%
in the 1970s, and now production was in decline. Some boosters
worked to keep the faith. In spite of the downturn, Gil Lytch of the
Phosphate Rock Export Association argued, "This is no permanent
downswing. We think it will pick up next year." 42
But it proved difficult for the industry to mount a turnaround,
thanks to unfavorable currency markets, farmer prerogatives, the
Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Phosphate Ban is Ended," New York Times, April 25,
1981; Steven Weisman, "Reagan Ends Curbs on Export of Grain to the Soviet
Union," New York Times, April 25, 1981.
41 Bill Keller, "Reagan's Russian Grain Harvest," New York Times, September 9,
' 1984; Funigello, American-Soviet Trade, 194-199.
42 S. Rick Czach, "Phosphate Slump Causes Drop in Cai·go at Port," Tampa Times,
September 17, 1981; Harry Costello, "Phosphate Overproduction, Stronger
Dollar Hurt Florida Industry," Tampa Tribune, October 22, 1981.
40
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strong dollar, large phosphate stores due to alleged overzealous
mining, and canceled orders. When phosphate prices were high
in the late 1970s, large amounts of phosphate rock were mined,
causing an overabundance in 1981. The industry reported that 16
million tons of already mined phosphate was currently in storage.
This was the largest reserve amount ever recorded. The dissolution of a deal that was scheduled to ship 1 .2 million tons of phosphate products to Poland exacerbated the problem. When the
Polish government was unable to secure the necessary credit, the
deal collapsed, adding 1.2 million tons of Florida rock to the phosphate glut. Poland, which had purchased 800,000 tons of Florida
phosphate in 1980 and was slated to steadily increase its consumption, was now no longer a consumer of Florida phosphate. To
make matters worse, Poland was not the only nation that reduced
its phosphate order. According to industry analysts, Italy reduced
its Florida phosphate imports. In 1980, Italy purchased 800,000
tons of Florida phosphate, but in 1981, when the exchange value of
the lira for the U.S. dollar increased from 780-1 to 1,300-1, the Italians only purchased 250,000 tons. Italy's reduced phosphate order
highlighted the challenges created for Florida phosphate when the
global value of the dollar increased in the early 1980s. Farmers in
both developed and developing nations drastically cut back their
use of phosphate-based fertilizers as a result. Brazil, Romania,
and Japan all purchased less phosphate in 1981, and International
Minerals and Chemical Corporation, one of the largest phosphate
producers in Florida, said that the adverse economic conditions
faced by the industry would result in a 15-20% decline in per share
earnings for the 1981 fiscal year. Fertilizer Institute President Ed
Wheeler told the Tampa Tribune, "The industry is in serious trouble.
Our plants are shutting down. Our people are being laid off.. . It's
the worst situation any of us can remember:" 43
Making matters worse, it wasn'tjust overseas farmers that limited tJ::ieir phosphate use. U .S. farmers reduced their fertilizer usage
as well, citing high borrowing costs due to high interest rates and
low crop prices. Iowa farmer Chuck Speas told the press he would
43
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be fortunate to cover his expenses in 1982. In order to decrease
his farm expenditures, Speas reduced his fertilizer use. "If I don't
need it, I'm not going to put it on," he said when discussing his
Iowa farm's production. Speas planned to test his soil to see if it
already contained adequate phosphate levels. A Kansas City headquartered fertilizer-marK:eting firm reported that in the American
corn belt fertilizer demand was down by 10-12% from the previous
year. Along with high borrowing costs, farmers fretted over declining prices. The price o corn was down dramatically in the early
1980s from approximately $3.50 a bushel in 1980 to $2.50 a bushel
in early 1983. The federal government's proposed "payment in
kind" program exacerbated- Flo rida phosphate's woes. The program, which incentivized farmers to grow less crops in order to
bring down agricultural surpluses and increase prices, may have
been good for farmers like Speas, but it was bad for the phosphate
industry's bottom line. International spokeswoman Janet Roth
lamented, "until the American farmer realizes improvement in his
condition we don 't see any improvement in ours." 44
In response to the downturn, seven of Florida's twenty-three
phosphate strip mines and five of its eighteen phosphate processing plants were closed. 2,800 workers were laid off by early 1982,
and the Florida Phosphate Council predicted further layoffs. At
first, the Occidental Company, thanks to the resumption of the
Soviet deal, did not feel th ~-pinch as much as some other Florida
phosphate producers. Though the company did lay off 225 workers during the early months of the phosphate downturn, its deal
with the Soviet Union protected it from shrinking domestic and
global markets. Florida's vast phosphate stores and overall market conditions, however, eventually took a toll. In May 1983, Occidental laid-off 200 more workers. Ruth Morgan, spokesperson for
Occidental, said, "This is something that had hit Central Florida
areas harder than it did us in the northern part of the state ... I
guess we're just now following." A total of 3,670 phosphate industry
workers throughout Florida, both blue and white collar, were out
of work by mid-1983. The industry downturn proved greater than
most had anticipated. Polk County was hit the hardest, losing $4
million in wages each week. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad, Tampa
Electric Company, and the Port of Tampa also reported layoffs due
44
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to phosphate's decline. Gator Freightways hauling service, the
environmental consulting firm Water and Air Research Inc., Central Maintenance and Welding of Lithia, and even the Pizza King
restaurant in Mulberry cited business downturns. Florida Phosphate Council spokesperson Bob Bonnell, citing the persistence of
high phosphate stores, predicted that the industry layoff rate could
eventually hit 30%. By the end of 1982, the industry had produced
just 26 million tons of phosphate, compared to 46 million tons in
1980. International's stock price had declined from $60 to $35 a
share. The industry was in trouble, but as Timothy Clarke of the
Florida Phosphate Council pointed out, the culprit was not peak
phosphate as many had predicted. In fact, a 1981 study argued that
the U.S. had vast phosphate supplies along the coast of North Carolina. Jim Cathcart of the U.S. Geologic Survey said the discovery
meant that the nation "can't be blackmailed by the equivalent of
an OPEC." Instead, it was global market conditions that were negatively impacting the industry, and Clark predicted industry consolidation. "Most knowledgeable industry observers think there will be
consolidation in the industry. They'll have to get bigger and have
more capital to compete. The smaller operations won't be able to
compete." 45
The Reagan Administration's lifting of the phosphate embargo, high-interest rates, large phosphate reserves, declining concerns about peak Florida phosphate, a strong U.S. dollar, and a
worldwide reduction in fertilizer applications combined to all but
obliterate serious objections to the Occidental-Soviet Deal. When
Zbignew Brzezinski, a former national security adviser to the Carter Administration, said on CBS's Face the Nation in 1982 that U.S.
sanctions in response to the Soviet Union's participation in the
Polish crisis should include a halting of phosphate shipments, his
ideas found few supporters. Tampa Tribune reporter Harry Costello
wrote "such a suggestion probably caused Occidental chairman
and president Dr. Armand Hammer's heart to begin palpitating,
and sent a nervous flush to the faces of many Florida phosphate
45
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manufactures." Fortunately for the industry, President Reagan
was again not swayed. With the industry in a slump and the business ties between Florida phosphate and the Soviets only recently
resumed, the Reagan administration showed little interest in blocking phosphate shipments. Not surprisingly, the industry argued a
new embargo would punish the Florida phosphate producers and
not Moscow, which could simply get its phosphate from Morocco.
After all, that was what Poland did after its deal with U.S. phosphate
producers fell through. In the end, Brzezinski's suggestion was
ignored by the Reagan administration, and after the lows of 19811982, the Florida phosphate industry did mount a minor recovery.
Production and imports i!lcreased in the mid-1980s, but they failed
to reach the highs of the late 1970s. In 1986, phosphate production
and profits slumped again as the Cold War neared its end. 46
Conclusion

In August 1984, the St. Petersburg Times published a 'what if?'
article. Twice a week, a large commercial Soviet vessel transporting liquefied anhydrous ammonia-as part of the Occidental
deal-squeezed under the Sunshine Skyway Bridge and headed to
Tampa's port. What if that ship crashed and spilled its cargo into
Tampa Bay waters? If such a disaster were to take place, a Coast
Guard study argued, the bay would be polluted and a 100 mile-wide
toxic cloud could blanke{"'t he bay area, forcing thousands to evacuate. The odds of this happening, however, were "one-in-a-zillion,"
according to Coast Guard Captain Joe Valenti. After all, several
security measures were in place. For example, the Coast Guard
escorted the Soviet ammonia barges under the Skyway and to their
docking locations at the port, no vessels were allowed within onehalf mile of the ships, and ammonia carriers were only allowed to
enter Tampa Bay when the sun was up . Because of these precautions, the Coast Guard was confident that the Soviet shipments did
not pose an environmental threat. Nor, port officials argued, did
the ammonia pose a threat to the Tampa Bay area once unloaded
46
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because it was pumped off the barges and into underground pipelines that delivered it to fertilizer facilities in central Florida. 47
Notably, the article made no mention of the Cold War political
debates surrounding the Occidental-Soviet deal. Only the environmental threat of the ammonia was discussed. The political concerns
of doing business with the Soviet Union were not mentioned. This
omission highlights that by 1984 the Cold War-inspired nationalistic thread of phosphate industry criticism had largely become a
thing of the past. Florida phosphate critics were once again by
the mid-l 980s focused on the industry's tax liability and pollution
emissions. Thus, when President Reagan signed a law banning
phosphate mining in Florida's Osceola National Forest in September 1984, no mention of the Cold War or the Occidental-Soviet
deal was made. 48
The 1974 Occidental-Soviet phosphate deal created a new
form of Florida phosphate industry criticism that lasted until the
Reagan Administration. This new critical thread was nationalistic
and grounded in 1970s Cold War detente geopolitics. More specifically, this nationalistic criticism was concerned about the political
47

48
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perils of providing phosphate to the Soviet Union, degrading Florida's environment in order to do so, and conserving phosphate
for domestic use. Nationalistic critics shared many of the same
concerns of local Florida politicians and environmentalists, whose
criticisms of the phosphate industry were not grounded in a Cold
War framework. Like them, nationalistic phosphate critics were
concerned about the degrading and depleting of Florida's environmental resources. However, the nationalistic critics were particularly concerned that finite Florida phosphate was being exported
to the Soviet Union at fixed subsidized prices. The nationalistic
critical thread was also engendered by the $180 million ExportImport Bank loan that W(!S secured in order to ship phosphate and
other chemicals between American businesses and the nation's ideological Cold War adversary. Although the Occidental-Soviet deal
only represented a small percentage of the phosphate strip mined
in Florida, the controversy surrounding the deal highlights the
politically-charged relationships between the Florida phosphate
industry, environmental concerns, 1970s Cold War detente, economic protectionism, and neoliberal market ideals. In short, the
phosphate industry and in particular the Occidental-Soviet deal
connected Florida to the broader Cold War world in distinct and
unique ways in the 1970s.
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